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ABSTRACT
During the past two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in equity-based pay for executives.
This paper analyzes why the primary goal of the equity-pay explosion--creating long-run ownership
incentives for top executives--has often been difficult to achieve in practice. More generally, I
describe six challenges in the design of equity-based pay plans and discuss potential solutions. The
six challenges involve: 
1. mismatched time horizons; 
2. gaming; 
3. the value-cost "wedge"; 
4. the leverage-fragility tradeoff; 
5. aligning risk-taking incentives; and 
6. avoiding excessive compensation.
The paper also discussed the merits of stock versus options and concludes that restricted stock is
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  There has been a dramatic change in both the level and composition of executive pay in 
the U.S. during the last two decades.  Executive compensation has increased sharply, driven 
almost entirely by an explosion in stock option grants.  What’s more, the trend toward equity-
based pay appears to be spreading to the rest of the developed world. 
  But what has equity-based pay really accomplished, and what can we expect in the 
future?  Let’s start with what can go right.  Besides attracting and retaining a high-quality 
management team, well-designed stock and stock option packages can increase corporate 
productivity and value by better aligning top managers’ interests with those of the shareholders.  
And despite all of the recent controversy, research shows that the increased use of stock options 
has greatly strengthened the link between executive pay and corporate performance during the 
last decade or two.  In their much-cited 1990 study of U.S. companies in the 1970s and early 
1980s, Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy reported that for every $1,000 change in a company’s 
market value in a given year, the average CEO’s total compensation for that year changed by only 
about three dollars.  In a study almost a decade later, Jeff Liebman and I found that by the end of 
the 1990s, the pay-to-performance link for U.S. CEOs had jumped almost tenfold since 1980—
due almost entirely to the proliferation of stock options during the 1990s.1 
  Yet this change in no way suggests that the stock option revolution has been all to the 
good.  Indeed, the current method of rewarding executives has significant flaws, as demonstrated 
by recent events when top executives of many companies cashed out significant portions of their 
options during the end of the bull market of the 1990s, a period when stock prices proved 
unsustainably high.  And whether achieved by accident or design, the resulting transfer of wealth 
to selling managers from existing (and particularly buying) shareholders generated considerable 
skepticism about corporate governance in general and executive compensation in particular.  At 
                                                 
* This article was prepared with the assistance of Research Associate Aaron M. G. Zimmerman.  
It draws heavily on material in Incentive Strategy II: Executive Compensation and Ownership 
Structure (HBS No. 902-134). 
1 See Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives,” 
Journal of Political Economy, April 1990, pp. 225-265; Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Are CEOs 
Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1998, pp. 653-691; and Brian J. 
Hall, “What You Need to Know About Stock Options,” Harvard Business Review, March-April 2000, pp. 
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the same time, companies whose stock prices have plummeted are now struggling with the dual 
problem of retaining employees with deeply underwater options and placating shareholders 
strongly opposed to repricing those options. 
  What has also become clear is that designing an effective equity-based compensation 
plan—one that motivates long-term value-maximizing behavior—is not a simple task.  There are 
difficulties associated with time horizons, opportunistic selling, the gaming of accounting 
numbers and stock prices, risk-taking, fairness, and what I will call option “fragility.”  Moreover, 
as this article will make clear, most stock options are worth considerably less to the executives 
they are meant to motivate than to the shareholders of the companies that grant them.  This 
“wedge” in value represents a significant cost to the firm’s shareholders—one that could tilt the 
balance toward the use of restricted stock or cash-based compensation instead.  Until recently, 
corporate decisions to grant options rather than restricted stock have clearly been influenced by a 
quirk of accounting—the fact that companies need not expense option grants on their income 
statements, whereas the cost of restricted stock, indexed options, and virtually all other executive 
compensation must flow through the P&L.  But a growing sensitivity to the drawbacks of options 
(which will only be reinforced if the accounting treatment is changed) is likely to cause many 
companies to consider restricted stock and cash-based compensation as more cost-effective 
alternatives to options. 
  In this article, I discuss the major challenges in designing equity-based play plans that 
effectively link executive compensation to long-run shareholder value.  Besides encouraging 
executives to balance long-term performance goals against the pressures to meet near-term 
earnings targets, corporate pay plans must also perform another difficult balancing act—
maintaining a strong pay-for-performance link (including reduced rewards when stock prices fall) 
while at the same time retaining capable executives.  There are dramatic differences in equity-
based pay plans, and the way companies set up these plans can have powerful effects on both 
incentives and retention.  But incentives can be a double-edged sword and must be carefully 
managed to prevent the loss of shareholder confidence and value. 
 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: RECENT HISTORY AND TRENDS 
As late as 1984, fewer than half of the CEOs of publicly traded U.S. companies were 
granted any stock or stock options in a given year.  With hindsight, it now seems clear that the 
resulting misalignment of incentives between managers and owners was a major contributor to 
the wave of U.S. corporate restructurings in the 1980s.  Private equity firms like Kohlberg Kravis 
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Roberts & Co. (KKR) and Clayton Dubilier & Rice bought up underperforming companies—or, 
in many cases, subsidiaries of large conglomerates—and achieved remarkable performance 
improvements by forcing managers to focus on profitability and shareholder value.  The change 
in managers’ motivation came from three main sources:  meaningful equity ownership, high debt 
payments that provided a new discipline by leaving managers with little free cash flow, and more 
active monitoring by a board made up entirely of major equity investors.2   
George Roberts, one of the founders of KKR, summed up the prevailing view of the 
importance of ownership incentives as follows: 
Just as you are likely to take better care of a home you own than one you rent, managers 
and boards with a financial commitment to their business are virtually always more 
effective in creating both short- and long-term value…  Companies perform better when 
all important parties—management, employees, and directors—have the incentive of 
ownership in the business.3 
In virtually all of these transactions, the top managers became co-owners by purchasing 
stock with their own or borrowed money and through compensation in the form of stock and 
options.  And the fact that the early buyout firms referred to their transactions as “management 
buyouts” (rather than “leveraged buyouts,” as they later became known) reflected the conviction 
that in terms of motivating executives to increase profitability and firm value, ownership structure 
and incentives were more important than the way the transactions were financed. 
The success of the management buyouts in raising productivity and shareholder value did 
not go unnoticed by the shareholders of public companies.4  In the early 1990s, after the leveraged 
restructuring movement had been shut down by a combination of market and regulatory forces, 
institutional investors began to use their power as owners to push managers to increase returns to 
shareholders.  This development, along with the sharp rise of venture-backed companies, led to 
                                                 
2 See Steven Kaplan, “The Evolution of U.S. Corporate Governance: We Are All Henry Kravis Now,” 
Journal of Private Equity, 1997, pp. 7-14; Bengt Holmstom and Steven Kaplan, “Corporate Governance 
and Takeovers in the U.S.: Making Sense of the ’80s and ’90s,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 
2001, pp. 121-144; and Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan, “The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: 
What’s Right and What’s Wrong?,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Spring 2003. 
3 George R. Roberts, “Corporate Governance and the Power of Ownership,” The Corporate Board, 
September/October 1998. 
4 For evidence that LBOs raised productivity and shareholder value, see, for example, Steven Kaplan, “The 
Effects of Management Buyouts on Operations and Value,” Journal of Financial Economics (1989), Vol. 
25, pp. 217-254; and Krishna G. Palepu, “Consequences of Leveraged Buyouts,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 27 (1990), pp. 247-262.   
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an enormous increase in the proportion of stock and (especially) stock options in top management 
compensation packages. 














































































































































Source: ExecuComp and data derived and spliced together from Hall-Liebman (1998) and Hall-Murphy (2002a).  The data from 1992 
to 2000 are from S&P500 Industrial companies while the data from the earlier years are from a sample of Forbes 500 companies.  
 
  Figure 1 shows the level and composition of top executive pay over the period 1980-
2001.  By 2001, equity-based pay constituted about two-thirds of the median annual total pay of 
U.S. top executives, up from zero as late as 1984.  What’s more, by the end of the 1990s, annual 
changes in the value of executives’ portfolios of company stock and options were swamping 
annual changes in cash pay.  In fact, studies estimated that, in a year of “normal” stock price 
volatility, changes in the value of executive stock and options were as much as 50 times the 
annual change in cash pay.5 
  Perhaps even more striking is the sharp increase in the level of top executive pay during 
the period.  The median CEO pay package rose from about $1 million in 1980 to over $7 million 
in 2001 (measured in 2001 dollars).  Thus, while the pay of the average rank-and-file worker 
                                                 
5 See Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, August 1998, pp. 653-691; and surveys by Kevin J. Murphy, “Executive Compensation,” in 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3 (1999), edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card; Robert M. Bushman 
and Abbie J. Smith, “Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance,” University of Chicago 
Working Paper, April 2001; and John E. Core, Wayne Guay, and David F. Larcker, “Executive Equity 
Compensation and Incentives: A Survey,” Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania, January 2002. 
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increased (in inflation-adjusted terms) by about 15% over the past 20 years, CEO pay increased 
by nearly 600%.  The only major groups with commensurate or larger percentage pay increases 
during this period were “superstar” actors and professional athletes.6 
  And U.S. trends in executive pay appear to be spreading internationally.  Table 1 shows 
changes in the composition of pay between 1996 and 2001 in 23 of the wealthiest countries 
(averaged by continent).  In each of the groups, the share of equity-based pay (as a percentage of 
total pay) increased by 12 percentage points or more, and such increases were all within range of 
the 19-percentage-point increase in the U.S.  (The main difference, of course, is that the 
proportion of equity-based pay in the U.S. in 1996 was already much higher than in other 
countries.)  And the same pattern emerges in the share of total “at-risk” pay—that is, cash bonus 
plus equity-based pay.  The percentage-point increase in U.S. at-risk pay is comparable to that in 
the other countries, although the U.S. share again begins and ends at a much higher level. 
 
Table 1 Changes in Executive Pay Composition: International Comparisons 
 
  Share of Equity-based Pay  Share of At-Risk Pay 
  1996 2001  Change  1996  2001  Change 
Europe (9)  6% 18%  12%  24% 37% 13% 
Asia (6)  6% 24%  18%  23% 39% 16% 
Latin America (4)  0% 21%  21%  26% 45% 19% 
Commonwealth (3)  8% 20%  12%  27% 46% 19% 
U.S. (1)  32% 51%  19%  51% 68% 17% 
Average (of 23 
countries)  6% 22%  16%  26% 42% 16% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data supplied by Towers Perrin.  The data are for industrial companies with $500 million in sales.  
The commonwealth countries are Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.  The share of equity-based pay includes the present value of 
“long-term incentives,” which primarily consist of stock, options and other equity-like pay.  The number in parentheses indicates the 




                                                
Equity-based pay has also increasingly become part of the compensation package for 
lower-level managers and workers.  Indeed, a 1999 study by William M. Mercer found that about 
40% of all large U.S. companies granted stock options to at least half of their employees, more 
than doubling from the early 1990s.  And this trend is particularly prevalent in the high-tech 
sector.  For example, at Akamai, an e-business infrastructure services provider, the heavy use of 
 
6 Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, “The Taxation of Executive Compensation,” in Tax Policy and the 
Economy, NBER volume edited by J. Poterba, MIT Press, Vol. 14, 2000. 
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stock options is said to reflect management’s and the board’s belief that “all employees should be 
owners and have equity.”7   In the words of Akamai president Paul Sagan, “Equity was a way of 
doing something that was psychological as well as financial—it was motivational to people and 
made them part-owners.  The sense was that we were working to build a new endeavor.  It was a 
big idea, but not without some risk—so there ought to be some big upside reward that comes with 
that risk.”8 
It is hard to estimate precisely the degree to which equity-based pay motivates managers 
and employees to increase shareholder value since cause and effect are difficult to disentangle.  
Nevertheless, there is now a considerable body of empirical evidence that suggests that equity 
holdings motivate executives to raise profitability and increase shareholder value.  For example, 
several recent studies have found that increases in stock-based pay are followed by improvements 
in both accounting and stock price performance.9  
 
CHALLENGES IN EQUITY-BASED PAY DESIGN 
  Incentives, however, can cut both ways.  If not designed with care, equity-based pay 
plans can end up motivating behavior that destroys value.  There are six fundamental challenges 
in designing equity-based pay plans that correctly align managerial (and employee) incentives 
with the pursuit of shareholder value:  
1.  mismatched time horizons;  
2. gaming; 
3.  the value-cost “wedge”;  
4.  the leverage-fragility tradeoff;  
5.  aligning risk-taking incentives; and 
                                                 
7 Brian J. Hall, Houston Lane, and Jonathan P. Lim, “Akamai’s Underwater Options (A),” HBS Case No. 
902-069, page 5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See John E. Core and David F. Larcker, “Performance Consequences of Mandatory Increases in 
Executive Stock Ownership,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 63 (2002), pp. 315-40.  See also 
Hamid Mehran, “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 38 (1995), pp. 163-184; John J. McConnell and Henri Servaes, “Additional 
Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27 (1990), pp. 
595-618; and Melissa Frye, “Equity-Based Compensation for Employees: Firm Performance and 
Determinants,” Working Paper, University of Central Florida, 2001, for similar evidence.  Other studies 
describe and analyze the reasons why such evidence is hard to interpret; see, for example, Murphy (1999), 
Bushman and Smith (2001), and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2002), all cited in footnote 3.  
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6.  avoiding excessive compensation. 
Understanding these six challenges provides important insight into the design of equity-based 
pay. 
Challenge 1: Mismatched Time Horizons 
 Well-designed  equity  plans  motivate  sustainable, or long-run, value creation.  One 
advantage of stock-based pay in this regard is that while accounting profits measure the past, 
stock prices reflect expectations about the future; they represent the market’s best forecast of how 
current actions will affect future profitability.  And investors, who can lose a lot of money by 
being wrong, have strong incentives to scrutinize executive decisions closely.  Viewed in this 
light, equity incentives are the best protection against short-term thinking. 
  But even so, equity-based pay is often criticized as encouraging executives to manage 
short-term earnings to appease Wall Street instead of managing for long-run value creation.  And 
given the market’s occasional bouts of excessive optimism, executives may be tempted to fool the 
market by figuring out ways to temporarily prop up their stock prices and then cash out their 
equity holdings.  Under pressure to boost the stock price, for example, managers may cut R&D or 
take other actions that increase short-term earnings at the expense of (appropriately discounted) 
long-run cash flow.  Such “short termism” is likely to be especially tempting for managers 
nearing retirement or whose jobs are on the line because of weak performance. 
  Solving, or at least limiting, the problem of short termism requires lengthening vesting 
periods and strengthening executive “ownership requirements.”  While many stock and option 
plans have vesting periods of four or five years, others have considerably shorter vesting periods. 
Al Dunlap of Sunbeam had stock and options that vested over his first two years as CEO, and 
when Sunbeam’s stock price surged, the contract was renegotiated to reduce the vesting period.10  
Virtually all executive contracts trigger “accelerated” vesting when an executive retires, which is 
likely to limit the value-creation horizons of executives approaching retirement. 
  Why are vesting periods so short?  Executives prefer short vesting because it makes their 
compensation less risky, and they are often able to get their boards to go along.  But boards 
should ask why an executive is “demanding” a short vesting period.  What does that say about the 
executive’s future plans and motivations?  Or about the executive’s confidence that he or she can 
successfully lead the company over the long haul?   
                                                 
10 See Brian J. Hall, Rakesh Khurana, and Carleen Madigan, “Al Dunlap at Sunbeam,” HBS Case No. 899-
218, 1999. 
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  Although vesting periods of five years or longer—and that extend beyond an executive’s 
tenure with the firm—represent a significant step in the right direction, longer vesting alone is not 
a perfect solution to the horizon problem.  Requiring executives to build up and hold company 
stock over a period of time—by purchasing the stock or by holding on to some portion of the 
stock after an option exercise—is also important for ensuring that executives have long horizons.  
Indeed, nearly half of large companies have formal “ownership guidelines” that require their top 
executives to acquire (over some number of years) company stock holdings with a value equal to 
some multiple (four to seven is the typical range) of annual salary.11  Long vesting of current 
equity compensation, combined with requirements that executives continue to amass and hold 
significant equity stakes, can go a long way toward lengthening managerial value-creation 
horizons. 
Challenge 2: Gaming 
  A close cousin of the horizon problem is the “gaming” problem.  Equity-based pay, 
combined with the intense pressure to meet Wall Street’s expectations, can push some executives 
to use accounting tricks or outright falsification of information to artificially boost the stock price. 
12  Unfortunately, high-powered equity-based pay—particularly when combined with very short 
or no vesting restrictions—can encourage actions that are unethical and wasteful at best, and 
massively value-destroying and fraudulent at worst. 13  The incentives to “game the system” and 
engage in questionable or illegal behavior are especially strong for managers in “overpriced” 
                                                 
11  Approximately 45%, according to Frederic W. Cook & Co.’s study of the 250 largest U.S. companies 
according to market capitalization, “2002 Top 250.” 
12 Some of the recent corporate scandals appear to have been associated with sharp increases in equity-
based pay without a strengthening of checks and balances. In the case of Enron, for example, these internal 
controls and boundary systems seem to have been quite weak.  See Malcolm Salter, “Innovation Corrupted: 
The Rise and Fall of Enron,” HBS Case No. 903-032, 2003. 
13  According to one study, option grants are followed by abnormal company returns, suggesting that 
executives are using their inside information about company performance to affect the timing of option 
grants (see David Yermack, “Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News 
Announcements,” Journal of Finance, June 1997, pp. 449-476).  But another study (Jennifer N. Carpenter 
and Barbara Remmers, “Executive Stock Option Exercises and Inside Information,” Journal of Business, 
Vol. 74 (2001), pp. 513-534) found no evidence that abnormal negative stock price performance follows 
executive stock sales, implying either that this type of gaming is not widespread or that executives trying to 
time sales are simply not very good at it.  Neither study rules out the possibility that some executives have 
successfully gamed the system by timing the sales of their company stock. 
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companies, where the pressure to meet the unrealistic expectations of Wall Street can be very 
great.14 
  More generally, the temptation to game the system increases with the potential rewards 
(or lack of punishments) associated with gaming.  Thus, managing the gaming problem requires 
boards and companies to pay close attention to these temptations and, especially, to strengthen 
internal controls.  This means devoting resources to building and reinforcing corporate systems 
designed to monitor risky behavior and to detect and deter gaming.  It may also call for 
improvements in the way the company communicates to its employees (through corporate codes 
of ethics, for example) the kinds of actions and behaviors that are clearly off-limits.15   
  One way to interpret the recent corporate scandals is that the massive increase in equity-
based pay during the previous decade or two created a corresponding increase in the temptations 
to game without the appropriate increase in internal controls and other checks against cheating.  
In some respects, boards became less focused on measuring and evaluating executive 
performance since so much of executive compensation was tied to stock price performance and so 
little to other measures of executive performance.  Put another way, boards had “outsourced” 
performance evaluation to the stock market.  But while the market is a powerful and useful 
measure of executive performance, the heavy reliance on equity-based pay calls for perhaps 
more, not less, rigorous evaluation of CEO actions and performance. 
Challenge 3: The Value-Cost “Wedge” 
  Mismatched time horizons and gaming are two fairly well-known problems that arise 
with equity-based pay.  But an even more fundamental issue is the potentially significant 
disparity between the real cost of an equity grant and the value of that grant to the executive or 
employee.  For the company, the market value of an equity grant represents the economic or 
“opportunity” cost of the equity—the amount the company could receive if the equity were sold 
to an outside investor rather than given to an executive or employee.16  But because executives 
                                                 
14 Joseph Fuller and Michael C. Jensen, “Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game,” 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Winter 2002, pp. 41-46. 
15 See Robert Simons, Performance Measurement and Control Systems for Implementing Strategy (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002) for a more detailed analysis of internal controls and boundary 
systems. 
16 But if the company’s cost of equity pay is thus reasonably approximated by its market value, that value 
must be adjusted for early exercise and expected forfeiture, both of which lower the cost on average.  
Furthermore, the cost to shareholders is independent of whether companies pay for the options by dilution 
(issuing new shares to pay option holders) or through share repurchases (which creates a cash cost).  See 
Brian J. Hall, “Exercise on Employee Stock Option Dilution,” HBS Case No. 902-162, 2002. 
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and employees are risk-averse and tend to hold personal asset portfolios that are “undiversified,” 
they generally value equity-based pay at less than its market value (as estimated using standard 
models such as Black-Scholes).  That is, because executives are forced (by vesting requirements, 
insider sales restrictions, or board pressure) to hold more company equity—and usually much 
more—than is desirable from a portfolio-diversification standpoint, they discount the value of 
their company equity holdings.17 
  As a general rule, then, the value to the executive of equity pay is generally lower than its 
cost to the company’s shareholders.  The value-to-cost (V/C) ratio depends on a number of 
factors,18 including: 
1.  the degree of diversification in the executive’s holdings (greater diversification 
increases V/C);  
2.  the risk aversion of the executive (greater risk aversion lowers V/C);  
3.  the volatility of the stock (higher volatility lowers V/C);  
4.  the vesting period of the equity (longer vesting lowers V/C); and, 
5.     in the case of stock options, the extent to which the options are in-the-money (the more 
in-the-money, the higher is the V/C). 
In the case of stock grants, the V/C discount is fairly modest, generally on the order of 
15% (or a 0.85 ratio) for an average-volatility stock.  But for standard at-the-money stock option 
grants, there is often a significant gap between value and cost, with V/C ratios ranging in most 
cases from 0.8 to as low as 0.4.  This suggests that option grants must be discounted (relative to 
their Black-Scholes value and assuming the options are not forfeited) by 20% to 60%—with 30% 
to 40% being “typical”—in order to determine the executive value of an option.  And that 30% to 
40% represents a “deadweight loss” to the company’s shareholders—a discount that, along with 
the market value of the option grant itself, must be justified by performance improvements 
stemming from the options-linked strengthening of retention and ownership incentives.   
                                                 
17 See Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, “Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,” 
American Economic Review, May 2000, pp. 209-215, and “Stock Options for Undiversified Executives,” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33 (2002); also see Richard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker, and 
Robert E. Verrecchia, “Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 29 (1991), pp. 129-150, and Lisa K. Meulbroek, “The Efficiency of Equity-
linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options,” Financial 
Management, Vol. 30 (2001), pp. 5-45, for a more detailed analysis. 
18 See Hall and Murphy (2002), cited earlier 
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In sum, the V/C wedge is a significant part of the price that companies must pay in order 
to generate the benefits of equity-based pay.  And, as I discuss later in more detail, this 
inefficiency could cause many companies to shift from option awards to restricted stock, or 
perhaps to shift some compensation away from equity and towards cash. 
Challenge 4: The Leverage-Fragility Tradeoff 
Partly offsetting the value-cost inefficiency of options is the fact that they are a 
“leveraged” incentive device.  That is, companies can grant employees more stock options than 
shares for the same cost to the company, since each option has a lower per-share cost than a share 
of stock.  As a result, for a given increase in the stock price, the upside gain from a given 
(market) value of options is generally higher than that of stock. . 
Table 2 shows how the value of stock or options changes with the stock price.  The 
entries in the table assume that one employee receives a share of stock worth $100 and another 
receives two at-the-money options, also worth $100.  The entries in the left half of the table show 
how the market value of the stock and options (based on Black-Scholes) changes when the stock 
price changes.  Increases in the stock price lead to exactly proportionate increases in the value of 
the stock award but proportionately greater increases in By contrast, the value of the options 
package increases more quickly than the stock package as the stock price increases.  For example, 
a 50% increase in the stock price (from $100 to $150) results in a 50% increase in the value of the 
stock award but an 83% increase in the options package. 
This analysis, however, fails to take into account the value-cost wedge—which, again, 
stems from the tendency of risk-averse and undiversified employees and executives to value 
options (and stock) at less than their market values.  The risk-adjusted executive values of stock 
and options are shown in the middle column of Table 2, and their “normalized” (to 1) values are 
shown in the right right-hand columns to show percentage changes in values.   
Accounting for risk aversion increases the difference between option and stock values.  
While the value of risk-adjusted stock still moves roughly in proportion with the stock price, the 
value of stock options increases even more sharply (in percentage terms) when the stock price 
increases.  Option values rise sharply in percentage terms as options move into the money.  
Options have great upside potential. Options are highly leveraged, and this leverage effect 
increases when the value-to-cost (V/C) ratio is taken into account. 
                                                 
20 Brian J. Hall and Thomas A. Knox, “Managing Option Fragility,” NBER Working Paper No. w9059, 
July 2002. 
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Option fragility.  But the leverage of options operates in both directions.  As shown in 
the table, the value of options also falls sharply in response to stock price decreases.  For 
example, a 50% fall in the stock price (from $100 to $50) lowers the value of the options by 69% 
(from $100 to $31)—and by 82% (from $65 to $12) when executive risk aversion is taken into 
account.  This helps explain why risk-averse individuals perceive far-underwater options as being 
almost worthless.  While this may be perhaps an attractive feature in terms of “punishing” 
executives (and employees) for decreases in the stock price, it also makes option incentives 
fragile.  That is, as options move farther out of the money, they tend to lose their power both to 
motivate and to retain executives.   
 
Table 2 Comparing the Upside Potential and Downside Risk of Stock and Options 
 
 




Stock  Price  Stock Options Stock Options Stock  Options 
$0  $0 $0 $0 $0  0  0 
25  25 8 21 1  0.25  0.02 
50  50 31 43 12  0.50  0.14 
75  75 63 64 35  0.75  0.54 
100 100  100 85  65 1.00  1.00 
125  125 140 105  98 1.24 1.50 
150  150 183 126 140 1.48 2.15 
 
Source:  Executive value calculations are risk-adjusted measures (certainty equivalents), taken from Hall and Knox (2002) and Hall 
and Murphy (2002).  The right-hand columns show normalizations—equal to 1.00 when the options are at-the-money to highlight 
percent changes in option values as they move into or out of the money.  Market value calculations are based on Black-Scholes 
assuming 50% volatility, five-year maturity, no dividend, and a 6% risk-free interest rate.  
 
Moreover, the probability of options falling under water is significant.  Even at the height 
of the bull market in 1999, about one-third of all options held by U.S. executives in publicly 
traded companies were underwater.20  In 2001, this number averaged over 50%.  Although 
options are more fragile in bear markets, they are also fragile incentive instruments in bull 
markets.21   
Managing Leverage and Fragility.  Designing option packages that properly balance 
the tradeoff between leverage and fragility is a difficult task.  There are three basic types of 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
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option plans, each of which varies in terms of leverage and fragility.22  Large, upfront grants (also 
known as “megagrants”), which fix the exercise price and number of options at the beginning, are 
highly leveraged and have the desirable feature (especially from the perspective of the recipient) 
of producing a very high payoff when the stock price increases.  Megagrants thus provide 
powerful incentives initially, but these incentives will erode if the stock price falls substantially.  
And if the drop in stock price is due mainly to factors beyond management’s control, the result 
may well be the loss of good managers. 
Fixed-value plans, which pay a certain pre-determined Black-Scholes value each year, 
have the opposite problem.  They are not as highly leveraged on the upside; in fact, if the stock 
price increases in a given year, the recipient receives fewer options and at higher exercise prices 
at the beginning of the next.  But such plans are much more robust in the event of stock price 
declines.  If the stock price drops in a given year, the executive actually receives a larger number 
of options (at the now lower exercise price) in order to hold constant the value of the annual 
grant. 
But if fixed-value plans can help retain executives who might be demoralized by a drop 
in the company’s stock price, the fact that such a policy can end up rewarding poor performance 
(by granting more stock options after down years) means that it can also work to undermine 
incentives.  A partial solution to this incentive problem is provided by multi-year plans that pay a 
fixed number of at-the-money options each year.  Such fixed-number plans represent a 
compromise between megagrants and fixed-value plans.  They provide smaller rewards for 
exceptional performance than megagrants but stronger incentives (and hence retention power) in 
the event of stock price declines.  At the same time, they avoid the distortion of incentives in 
fixed-value plans by increasing the value of option grants following good years and decreasing 
their value after down years. 
In designing equity-based pay packages, then, companies must carefully weigh the 
incentive benefits of leverage against the retention costs of fragility.23   The challenge in 
designing multi-year option plans is to create sufficient upside potential for incentive alignment 
purposes while at the same time preserving the company’s ability to retain and motivate 
executives if the stock price falls sharply.  After large price declines, many companies, in 
                                                 
22 Brian J. Hall, “What You Need to Know About Stock Options,” Harvard Business Review, March-April 
2000, pp. 121-129, and “The Design of Multi-year Stock Option Plans,” Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 12 No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 97-106. 
23 For more detailed analysis of the relative merits of each of these types of plans, see Hall (2000), cited 
earlier. 
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practice, grant “extra” options the following year—a form of back-door repricing.24  But if this 
response makes sense when price declines are caused by factors that are clearly beyond the 
executives’ control, it is likely to provoke unrest among stockholders when poor management and 
not poor market conditions is to blame.   
The Case for Indexed Options.  Many academics, and some in the press, argue that  
indexed options—where the exercise price is tied to some market or industry index—create the 
possibility of a tighter link between pay and performance without jeopardizing executive 
retention.  With indexed options, executives are rewarded (or punished) according to their success 
in outperforming their competitors or the broad market. Yet despite what appear to be significant 
advantages to indexed options, they are virtually nonexistent.  A survey of one thousand 
companies found that only one company had an indexed option plan.27  Of course, indexed 
options are somewhat complex and can introduce difficult design problems.  For example, what 
index should be used?  Should the index be “beta” adjusted?  Do we always want to remove 
industry or market changes?28  Will executives and employees understand them? 
But the main obstacle to indexed options is probably their unfavorable accounting 
treatment—the cost of such options must be expensed on corporate income statements. If the 
same treatment is eventually extended to standard at-the-money options, we are likely to see more 
interest in the design of indexed equity pay.29 
                                                 
24 Hall and Knox (2002) 
27 Note that the fact that indexed options are rarely used even by companies with large owners, who have 
strong incentives to design equity-pay instruments well, is a challenge to the view that any type of indexed 
options are a good idea. 
28 For evidence and analysis regarding indexed options, see Lisa K. Meulbroek, “Restoring the Link 
Between Pay and Performance: Evaluating the Costs of Relative-Performance-Based (Indexed) Options,” 
HBS Working Paper 02-021, 2001, and “Designing an Option Plan that Rewards Relative Performance: 
Indexed Options Revisited,” HBS Working Paper 02-022, September 2001; see also Shane A. Johnson and 
Yisong S. Tian, “Indexed Executive Stock Options,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 57 (2000). 
29 WebScale in “Sara’s Options” (Brian J. Hall, Peter Tufano, and Joshua Musher, HBS Case No. 201-005, 
2001) is a rare example. 
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Challenge 5: Aligning Risk-Taking Incentives 
One of the most commonly alleged benefits of options is that they help overcome 
managers’ natural aversion to risk.  Although it is hard to know the optimal level of risk-taking 
for a given company, there are good reasons to believe that,, without the risk-taking incentives 
provided by equity-based pay, executives would be overly conservative with the corporate assets 
they manage.  There are two main reasons for this.  First, it is not irrational for executives to want 
to avoid risky bets that may jeopardize their positions.  Since they are much more likely to be 
fired for poor company performance, they may be wary of taking bets—even bets with high 
expected payoffs—that have a significant chance of failure.  Second, risk-averse executives with 
a disproportionate amount of financial and human capital invested in one firm will rationally tend 
to take fewer risks (harking back to the value-cost wedge). Options promote more risk-taking 
because increases in the volatility of a company’s stock price actually increase the value of its 
options (while leaving stock prices unaffected). Options can thus add value by encouraging 
managers to move the firm closer to its optimal level of risk.30   
But standard options do not necessarily induce more risk-taking because there are two 
opposing forces at work.  Managers with lots of at-the-money (or in-the-money) options can 
become overly cautious, unwilling to jeopardize a large anticipated payoff that will accrue even if 
the stock price increases at just the T-bill rate.  On the other hand, options increase in expected 
value in response to higher volatility and risk.  Thus, although the risk aversion of executives 
makes them want to reduce risk following the option grant, the higher expected payoff 
encourages more risk-taking—and the net effect of these two factors is uncertain. 
Although the effect of executive risk aversion is hard to measure, the relationship 
between greater risk-taking and higher payoffs can be quantified.  Table 3 shows how the value 
                                                 
30 Options can also encourage overly risky behavior, either because options more than offset natural biases 
against risk-taking or because these biases are inconsequential, especially if the options are way out of the 
money.  Perhaps the most direct evidence we have on this issue relates to the behavior of S&L managers 
and owners.  When the S&Ls became insolvent, or nearly so, in the 1980s, the owners/managers of these 
institutions were confronted with option-like payoffs (and federal deposit insurance enabled them to 
“borrow” from depositors without paying for their risk-taking behavior).  They would become very wealthy 
if the risky loans paid off, and would lose little or nothing if the bets did not pay off.  The result was the 
S&L crisis, which necessitated a taxpayer-financed bailout on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars. 
For details about risk-taking incentives and behavior in banking, see Benjamin C. Esty, “Organizational 
Form and Risk Taking in the Savings and Loan Industry,” Journal of Financial Economics, April 1997, pp. 
25-56, and “The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, February 1998, pp. 189-218. 
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of at-the-money options (where both the strike price and the stock price are equal to $129) 
changes when volatility increases by 10% (or five percentage points), from 50% to 55%.  The 
option value increases by about 6%, from $65.83 to $69.86.  This represents a “risk-taking 
elasticity” 0of 0.6—that is, a 10% increase in volatility causes a 6% increase in option value. 
Table 3  Incentives to Take Risks: How Option Value Changes as Volatility Changes  
 
  At the Money  In the Money  Out of the Money  
Option Value       
   At 50% volatility  $65.83  $180.67  $20.52 
   At 55% volatility  $69.86  $184.78  $23.32 
Percent increase in option value  6%  2%  14% 
Risk-taking elasticity  0.6  0.2  1.4 
 
Notes:  All options have a five-year duration; dividends are assumed to be zero and the risk-free rate is 6.3%.  For at-the-money 
options, the stock price is $129 and the exercise price is $129.  For in-the-money options, the stock price is $260 and the exercise price 
is $129.  For out-of-the money options, the stock price is $65 and the exercise price is $129.  Risk-taking elasticity is the percentage 
increase in option value divided by the percentage increase in volatility. 
 
Note that the risk-taking elasticity is much smaller when the options are substantially in 
the money.  For example, if the stock price is twice the strike price, the elasticity is only 0.2.  In-
the-money options thus create risk-taking incentives that are not too dissimilar from ordinary 
stock.  Conversely, options that are substantially out of the money—in the example in the table, 
the stock price is half the strike price—have a risk elasticity of 1.4, or more than twice the risk 
elasticity of the at-the-money options. 
  Out-of-the-money options, then, are quite responsive to changes in volatility.  And it is 
not hard to see why: as options fall farther out of the money, the only way to produce a positive 
payoff is to pursue riskier investments that widen the tails of the distribution of possible 
outcomes.  Risk-taking incentives are thus strongest for out-of-the-money options and weakest 
for in-the-money options (and weaker still for stock).31  in fact, standard (at-the-money) options—
especially options that have moved significantly into the money—may actually cause executives 
to take fewer risks.32 
                                                 
31 Note that the risk-taking incentives for options also increase as the option package (especially an 
underwater package) moves close to the maturity date.   That is, the “end game” for underwater options can 
be particularly destructive. 
32 For evidence that options do increase risk-taking relative to stock, see Peter Tufano, “Who Manages 
Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry,” Journal of 
Finance 51, 1996.  He finds evidence regarding risk management in the gold mining industry: Managers 
who hold options manage less gold price risk while managers who hold common stock manage more gold 
price risk.  See also Richard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker, and Robert E. Verrecchia, “Portfolio 
Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation, Journal of Accounting Research 29, Spring 1991, pp. 
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Challenge 6: Avoiding Excess 
Equity-based pay, especially option-based pay, generally consists of complex financial 
instruments, which can make valuation difficult.  This presents two problems.  First, to the extent 
that boards, managers, and employees fail to understand the value of options, and how option 
values change with stock price fluctuations, the usefulness of options as a compensation and 
incentive device is undermined.  Second, the complexity of equity-based pay may lead to abuses 
and misallocations of value, since boards do not always understand how much value they are 
transferring to executives when they make option grants.  And even if they do understand, boards 
that are overly friendly with top executives may use the complexity—and lack of transparency—
of equity packages to make overly generous grants to their friends.   
  Apple CEO Steve Jobs was given an option grant with a Black-Scholes value in excess of 
$500 million.33  Likewise, Tyco’s CEO Dennis Kozlowski was granted nearly six million 
options—5.1 million new options in Tyco, plus 800,000 options in the Tycom subsidiary—with a 
Black-Scholes value of $81 million.34  It is hard to imagine that the size of these packages was 
necessary for either motivation or retention purposes.  Did the board fully understand the value of 
the transfer they were making?  Would such grants have been possible if the value of the 
(expected) transfer from shareholders to executives was less complex?  Determining the optimal 
level of equity-based pay is a major challenge for boards. 
 
THE CASE FOR STOCK vs. OPTIONS 
Much of the preceding discussion of the challenges in equity-pay design has focused on 
options, since options have been the predominant form of equity-based pay for U.S. executives 
during the previous two decades.   Yet if the key goal of equity-based pay is to create owners out 
of managers, why not use stock?  After all, owners are stockholders, not option holders.  Using 
                                                                                                                                                 
129-150, who fail to find evidence that options increase risk-taking behavior.  Indeed, their evidence 
suggests (weakly) the opposite.   
33 This is based on the author’s Black-Scholes calculation.  See also Geoffrey Colvin, “The Great CEO Pay 
Heist,” Fortune, June 25, 2001. 
34 Also, he received 800,000 shares of restricted stock on January 22, 2002, in a “retention agreement” 
detailed in the Tyco September 30, 2001 10-K filing.  Unlike the millions of shares Kozlowski was granted 
in the past, 100,000 shares of this grant vest annually regardless of Tyco’s performance.  With the stock 
price closing at $47.55 a share on the day they were granted, the 800,000 shares of restricted stock were 
worth $38 million.  Mark Maremont, “Tyco CEO’s Stock Options Yield $99.9 Million Gain,” Wall Street 
Journal, January 30, 2001. 
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the principles discussed so far, I now outline some of the significant advantages of restricted 
stock—stock that vests slowly over time—relative to options.  
  First, the incentives provided by stock ownership to improve performance and add 
value—and, in fact, to stay in the current job—are not so dramatically affected by changes in the 
stock price.  As we saw earlier, the incentives created by options are fragile in the sense that both 
the incentive and retention effects of options diminish as the stock price falls.  This fragility of 
option incentives is the reason why many companies have faced an underwater options crisis.  
Stock has the important advantage of not being able to fall underwater.  Akamai, for example, 
addressed its underwater options problem by allowing its executives and employees to exchange 
their options for shares of stock (albeit fewer shares).  That is, the company’s management 
decided that the key advantage of options—its upside potential—was more than offset by its 
countervailing disadvantage—its fundamental fragility.  Although less leveraged than options, 
restricted stock continues to provide reasonably strong ownership and retention incentives 
whether the stock price rises or falls.   
Second, the value/cost ratio is generally higher for stock.  As stated earlier, the value of 
equity-based pay to recipients is generally less than its true cost.  Although the value/cost 
differential between stock and options varies with factors such as the diversification and risk 
aversion of the executive and the volatility of the stock, estimates suggest that the value-to-cost 
discount for stock is two to three times less than that of options under the most plausible 
assumptions.  That is, while an executive holding a grant of restricted stock might value it at 80% 
to 90% of its cash value, he or she might value an (at-the-money) options grant at only 50% to 
75% of its cash value, all other things constant.35  And critically important, because stock is more 
highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of expected cost to shareholders), it can 
generate stronger and more cost-effective ownership incentives than options in a wide variety of 
cases.36  The relative merits of stock are particularly high when executives are fairly risk-averse 
and undiversified. 
  Finally, stock grants are much less complex to value and much more transparent—to 
stockholders, employees, and the press—than option grants.  Deriving the value of an at-the-
money option package is far trickier and involves use of a complex (and poorly understood) 
valuation model that produces what many practitioners call a “theoretical value.”   When Fortune 
magazine put Steve Jobs on the cover of a June 2001 issue and claimed that his options package 
                                                 
35 See Hall and Murphy (2002), cited earlier. 
36 Ibid. 
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was the largest-ever compensation package at $872 million, Jobs countered that his option 
package was worth zero since the options were underwater.  An argument in which the two sides 
differ by nearly a billion dollars suggests a fair degree of complexity.  The package had a Black-
Scholes value of about $170 million at the time the article was written.  But the fact that the 
package could be said to be worth zero creates confusion about the issue, and confusion can lead 
to abuse. 
  It is noteworthy that most of the seemingly outrageous executive pay packages have 
involved options rather than stock, in part because boards better understand what they are giving 
away when they grant stock.  To the extent that the complexity of option valuation contributes to 
excesses in pay, a change from option-based to stock-based pay should help curb such excesses. 
 
BUT IS EXECUTIVE PAY REALLY “EXCESSIVE”? 
  With the surge in equity pay, newspapers and media reports have become saturated with 
stories about “executive greed” and “out-of-control pay.”  But despite the large increases in 
executive pay over the past two decades, and fairly convincing evidence of excesses in particular 
cases, it is hard to determine whether the overall level of executive pay is too high by looking at 
pay outcomes alone.  The chief difficulty is that there is no obvious benchmark.  What is 
“excessive”?  Should executive pay be compared to employee pay?  To the pay of investment 
bankers?  The pay of European executives?  What percentage of the upside (or downside) of 
shareholder value should executives receive? 
  Although it is hard to make strong statements about executive pay levels by looking at 
pay outcomes, it is possible to shed some light on this issue by looking at the pay-setting process.  
That is, it is hard to determine whether a pick-up baseball game was played fairly by looking only 
at the final score.  But a close examination of the circumstances would allow such a 
determination—for example, did both teams have the same number of players, the same number 
of outs, and so forth. 
One measure of “appropriate executive pay” is the level of compensation determined in 
competitive labor markets with a sound process overseen by an independent board.  Let’s analyze 
U.S. executive pay with regard to each of these three criteria. 
  Although there is clearly some degree of competition in executive labor markets, it varies 
widely by specific circumstances.  Some executives compete with a large number of fairly similar 
candidates, while other executives—particularly at the CEO level—vie for positions among a 
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pool with only a few candidates.  In such situations, the CEO has great bargaining power and the 
executive labor market is not highly competitive.   
  A second clear contributor to the rise in CEO pay is an upward bias that is built into the 
executive pay-setting process.  The compensation committees of boards make heavy use of “pay 
surveys” compiled by compensation consultants on executive pay at companies that are 
comparable (in terms of size, industry, and so on).  But since most boards feel that their 
executives are “above average,” they elect to pay in the upper half of the distribution—for 
example, at the 60
th or 75
th percentile.  Although hard to prove conclusively, the proposition that 
the increased use of compensation surveys has contributed to the rise in executive pay is 
consistent with both the views of practitioners—including executives and compensation 
consultants themselves—and the findings of empirical studies.37  
  In a related vein, the use of surveys was encouraged by rule changes in 1993 that required 
companies to detail more fully the pay of their top executives in company proxy statements.  One 
of the hopes of the new rules was that greater disclosure would slow the increase in executive 
pay, with the publicity about high pay working to curb abuses.  But once executives began to see 
more clearly how much their peers were making, they wanted more—and boards granted more.  
Thus, although disclosure generally curbs excesses, in this case it may have had the opposite 
effect. 
  A third potential contributor to pay excesses is the lack of board independence.  While 
some companies have strong and independent boards, other boards are filled with close associates 
of the CEO who are reluctant to rein in the CEO’s pay, corrupting the pay process.38  Consistent 
with this, academic research suggests that companies with weaker governance structures award 
greater pay to top executives than do firms with stronger governance.39  Stronger boards can play 
an important role both in checking the power and influence of CEOs and in curbing excessive 
compensation. 
                                                 
37 See John M. Bizjak, Michael L. Lemmon, and Lalitha Naveen, “Has the Use of Peer Groups Contributed 
to Higher Levels of Executive Compensation?,” Working Paper, December 2000, and Jay W. Lorsch, 
“Compensating CEOs: A Process View,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 99-013, 1998, for 
evidence and analysis. 
38 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, and David I. Walker, “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69 (3), pp. 751-846, for 
evidence and analysis that CEOs have too much power in the pay-setting process. 
39  John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker, “Corporate Governance, CEO 
Compensation, and Firm Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51 (1999), pp. 371-406. 
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  In sum, there are good reasons to believe that the executive pay process leads, at least in 
some cases, to excessive pay.  The upward pressures on pay are particularly strong when the 
dominant form of executive pay is a complex and hard-to-value equity instrument like options.   
 
ACCOUNTING FOR OPTIONS 
  Standard at-the-money option grants do not create an expense to the P&L, either at the 
time of grant or at the time of exercise.  By comparison, a restricted stock grant creates an 
immediate expense (as does the use of nonstandard options).  Options are approximately 15 times 
more common than stock grants in the U.S.  While there are many possible explanations for the 
dominance of options over stock, managers and other practitioners often claim that the accounting 
treatment of options is among the most important.  Despite the fact that companies must disclose 
option compensation in mandatory footnotes, a surprisingly high percentage of managers believe 
that investors will punish the stock price if options are expensed, forcing their companies to cut 
back on their use. 
  The accounting treatment of options is currently at the center of a heated debate.  
Proponents of expensing options argue that options are a genuine cost to shareholders.  As 
Warren Buffett has observed, “If options are not compensation, what are they?  If compensation 
is not an expense, what is it?  If expenses don’t go on the P&L, where do they go?”40  Opponents 
of expensing options argue that options are hard to value, do not represent a cash expense, and—
perhaps most important, especially in the high-tech sector—would cause companies to scale back 
option-based pay. According to venture capitalists John Doerr and Frederick Smith, “Counting 
options as an expense would actually distort and confuse the picture considerably.  It could also 
prevent millions of workers from sharing in the success of their firms through employee 
ownership.”41    
  But none of this alters the reality that options represent a real cost to shareholders, and 
that treating one type of costly compensation instrument as “free” while expensing others creates 
an uneven playing field that distorts executive (and employee) pay practices.  The current 
accounting controversy raises the possibility that options are also being overused for rank-and-file 
employees.  U.S. companies have increasingly pushed their option plans lower into the 
                                                 
40 Quinn, B., “Letters to the Editor: Stock Options: Heads We Win, Tails You Lose,” The Wall Street 
Journal, April 19, 2002. 
41 John D. Doerr and Frederick W. Smith, “Leave Options Alone,” New York Times, April 5, 2002. 
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organization.  As mentioned earlier, a recent study by William M. Mercer found that about 40% 
of all large companies have granted options to at least half of their employees, a more than 
doubling from the early 1990s.  Moreover, a high percentage of options—about two-thirds 
according to one study42—are held by non-executive employees.  
  Although options clearly help firms attract and retain employees (option fragility 
notwithstanding), the evidence that broad-based plans are effective in increasing firm 
performance is at best mixed.43  While a broad-based option plan has the advantage of reminding 
employees that the firm has owners, and perhaps contributes to an “ownership culture,” such 
plans are a fairly blunt incentive instrument.  From the perspective of any one worker in a very 
large company, the connection between effort and value is fairly small and likely to be swamped 
by other factors.  The fact that broad-based option plans are not a very targeted incentive device, 
combined with the low value/cost efficiency of options, suggests that options are being used too 
heavily in broad-based compensation plans, and that companies should consider making greater 
use of restricted stock and cash-based compensation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  There has been a dramatic rise in equity-based pay during the past two decades. When 
structured properly, equity pay can add value by aligning the incentives of managers and 
shareholders while attracting and retaining qualified executives.  But it is not at all clear that 
equity pay has been well structured, especially given its uneven accounting treatment, which may 
well have created a value-destroying bias in favor of options and against cash, stock, and other 
forms of compensation.44  Without rules that level the accounting playing field between options 
and other forms of pay, it is difficult to know the extent of this bias or how much corporate value, 
if any, is being destroyed. 
  In the coming years, new rules and regulations, and perhaps changes in corporate 
governance, may slow or even reverse the growth in equity-based pay for executives.  But while 
                                                 
42 John E. Core and Wayne R. Guay, “Stock Option Plans for Non-executive Employees,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 61 (2001), pp. 253-287. 
43 See Core and Guay (2001), cited above; Richard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker, and Christopher D. 
Ittner, “The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy 
Firms,” Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania, January 2001; and Simi Kedia and Abon Mozumdar, 
“Performance Impact of Employee Stock Options,” Harvard Business School Working Paper, August 2002, 
for evidence. 
44  Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, “Expense Options to Level the Playing Field,” Boston Globe, 
October 6, 2002. 
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the form of equity pay may change, the large and growing influence of institutional investors 
likely to ensure that equity-based pay remains a significant component of executive compensation 
in the U.S. during the next decade.  For good reasons, owners want managers to hold equity.  
Thus, although some of the methods have been called into question, the goal of creating 
ownership incentives is unlikely to disappear.  The challenge that remains is curbing pay excesses 
while experimenting with new (and old) ways of linking executive rewards and long-run value 
creation. 
BRIAN HALL is Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business 
School. 
  
  23SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY 
 References   
 
Aggarwal, R.K. and A.A. Samwick, 1999, “The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk 
on Executive Compensation,” Journal of Political Economy 107(1).  
Antle, R. and J.S. Demski, 1988, “The Controllability Principle in Responsibility Accounting,” 
Accounting Review 63(4), 700-716. 
Antle, R. and A. Smith, 1986, “An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance 
Evaluation of Corporate Executives,” Journal of Accounting Research 24(1), 1-39. 
Baker, G.P. and B.J. Hall, 2001, “CEO Incentives and Firm Size.” HBS Working Paper and 
NBER Working Paper W6868 (December 1998). 
Baker, G.P. and G.D. Smith, 1998, The New Financial Capitalists: Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and 
the Creation of Corporate Value.  Cambridge University Press. 
Baumol, W.J. and B.G. Malkiel, “Stock Options Keep the Economy Afloat,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 4, 2002. 
Bebchuk, L.A., J.M. Fried and D.I. Walker, 2002 “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation,” University of Chicago Law Review 69 (3), 751-846. 
Berle, A.A., Jr. and G.C. Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New 
York: Macmillan.  
Bizjak, J.M., M.L. Lemmon and L. Naveen, 2000, “Has the Use of Peer Groups Contributed to 
Higher Levels of Executive Compensation?” Draft. 
Black, F. and M. Scholes, 1973, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,” Journal of 
Political Economy 81 (May-June), 637-654. 
Bushman, R.M. and A.J. Smith, April 2001, “Financial Accounting Information and Corporate 
Governance,” Working Paper.  
Carpenter, J.N., 2000. “Does Option Competition Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?” Journal of 
Finance 55 (5). 
Carpenter, J.N. and B. Remmers, November 28, 2000.  “Executive Stock Option Exercises and 
Inside Information,” New York University Working Paper. 
Cohen R. and B.J. Hall, 2002, “The Effect of Stock Options on Executive Risk-Taking,” Working 
Paper. 
Core, J.E., W.R. Guay and R.E. Verrecchia, 2000, “Are Performance Measures Other than Price 
Important to CEO Incentives?” Draft. 
Core, J.E. and W.R. Guay, 2001, “Stock Option Plans for Non-executive Employees,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, August. 
Core, J.E., R.W. Holthausen and D.F. Larcker, 1999,  “Corporate Governance, CEO 
Compensation, and Firm Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406. 
Core, J.E. and D.F. Larcker, 2002, “Performance Consequences of Mandatory Increases in 
Executive Stock Ownership,” Journal of Financial Economics 63 (3), 315-40. 
Cotter, J. F. and M. Zenner, 1994, “How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 35, 63-86. 
Doerr, J.D. and F.W. Smith, “Leave Options Alone,” New York Times, April 5, 2002.  
  24SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY 
Esty, B.C., 1997,  “Organizational Form and Risk Taking in the Savings and Loan Industry,” 
Journal of Financial Economics. 
Esty, B.C., 1998, “The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking,” 
Journal of Financial Economics. 
Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy, 1990, “Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive 
Officers,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43(3), 30s-51s. 
Gompers, P.A. and A. Metrick, 2001,  “Institutional Investors and Equity Prices,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 116 (1).  
Hall, B.J., 2002,  “Ownership Incentives and Societal Value Creation,” HBS Draft Note. 
Hall, B.J., “What You Need to Know About Stock Options,” 2000, Harvard Business Review, 
March-April 2000. 
Hall, B.J., 1999,  “The Design of Multi-year Stock Option Plans,” Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 12. 
Hall, B.J., “Exercise on Employee Stock Option Dilution,” HBS No. 902-162. 
Hall, B.J., “Incentive Strategy Within Organizations,” HBS No. 902-131. 
Hall, B.J., “Incentive Strategy II: Executive Compensation and Ownership Structure,” HBS No. 
902-134. 
Hall, B.J., R. Khurana and C. Madigan, “Al Dunlap at Sunbeam,” HBS No. 899-218. 
Hall, B.J. and R. Khurana, 2002, “International Executive Succession and Compensation,” Draft. 
Hall, B.J. and T.A. Knox, 2002,  “Managing Option Fragility,” HBS Working Paper. 
Hall, B.J. and J.B. Liebman, 1998, “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 113 (3). 
Hall, B.J. and J.B. Liebman, 2000,  “The Taxation of Executive Compensation,” in Tax Policy 
and the Economy, NBER volume edited by J. Poterba, MIT Press, Vol. 14. 
Hall, B.J., H. Lane and J.P. Lim, “Akamai’s Underwater Options (A),” HBS No. 902-069. 
Hall, B.J., H. Lane and J.P. Lim, “Akamai’s Underwater Options (B): The Decision,” HBS No. 
902-195. 
Hall, B.J. and C. Madigan, “Gerald Weiss,” HBS No. 899-258. 
Hall, B.J., C. Madigan and N. Wasserman, “Stock Options at Virtua.Net,” HBS No. 801-324. 
Hall, B.J. and K.J. Murphy, 2002a,  “Stock Options for Undiversified Executives,” Journal of 
Accounting and Economics. 
Hall, B.J. and K.J. Murphy, 2002b, “Expense Options to Level the Playing Field,” Boston Globe, 
Oct. 6. 
Hall, B.J. and K.J. Murphy, 2001, “Option Value Does Not Equal Option Cost,” WorldAtWork 
Journal, Second Quarter 2001. 
Hall, B.J. and K.J. Murphy, 2000, “Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,” 
American Economic Review. 
Hall, B.J., C. Rose and G. Subramanian, “Circon (A),” HBS No. 801-403. 
Hall, B.J., P. Tufano and J. Musher, “Sara’s Options,” HBS No. 201-005. 
  25SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY 
Jensen, M.C. and E.F. Fama, 1994, “Separation of Ownership and Control.” In Management of 
Non-profit Organizations, edited by S. M. Oster. Dartmouth Publishing. (Also published in 
Journal of Law and Economics 26(2) (June, 1983) and M.C. Jensen, Foundations of 
Organizational Strategy, Harvard University Press, 1998. 
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
Jensen, M.C. and K.J. Murphy, 1990a, “Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives,” 
Journal of Political Economy 98(2), 225-64. 
Jensen, M.C. and K.J. Murphy, 1990b, “CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But 
How,” Harvard Business Review (May). 
Johnson, S.A and Y.S. Tian, 2000, “Indexed Executive Stock Options,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 57. 
Kedia, S. and A. Mozumdar, 2002. “Performance Impact of Employee Stock Options,” HBS 
Draft, January. 
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu, 2000a,  “Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets?  An 
Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups,” Journal of Finance 55 (2).  
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu, 2000b,  “The Future of Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Long-
Run Evidence from Chile,” Academy of Management Journal 43 (3).  
Khurana, R., 2002, Searching for a Corporate Savior: Charisma, Closure and Market Failure in 
the CEO Labor Market. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Lambert, R.A., W. Lanen, and D. Larcker, 1989, “Executive Stock Options and Corporate 
Dividend Policy,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24(4), 409-425. 
Lambert, R.A., D.F. Larcker and C.D. Ittner, 2001, “The Structure and Performance 
Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms,” Draft. 
Lambert, R.A., D.F. Larcker and R.E. Verrecchia, 1991, “Portfolio Considerations in Valuing 
Executive Compensation.”  Journal of Accounting Research 29 (1). 
Lewellen, W., C. Loderer, and A. Rosenfeld, 1985, “Merger Decisions and Executive Stock 
Ownership in Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 209-31. 
Loderer, C. and K. Martin, 1997, “Executive Stock Ownership and Performance: Tracking Faint 
Traces,” Journal of Financial Economics 45, 223-56. 
Lorsch, J.W., 1998, “Compensating CEOs: A Process View,” Working Paper 99-013. 
McConnell, J. and H. Servaes, 1990, “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate 
Value,” Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612. 
Mehran, H., 1995,  “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184. 
Merton, R.C., 1973, “Theory of Rational Option Pricing,” Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 4, 141-183. 
Meulbroek, L.K., 2001a,  “Restoring the Link Between Pay and Performance: Evaluating the 
Costs of Relative-Performance-Based (Indexed) Options,” HBS Working Paper 02-021. 
Meulbroek, L.K., 2001b,  “Designing an Option Plan that Rewards Relative Performance: 
Indexed Options Revisited,” HBS Working Paper 02-022 (September 2001). 
  26SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY 
  27
Meulbroek, L.K., 2001c, “The Efficiency of Equity-linked Compensation: Understanding the Full 
Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options,” Financial Management 30(2), 5-30. 
Maremont, M., “Tyco CEO’s Stock Options Yield $99.9 Million Gain,” Wall Street Journal, 
January 30, 2001. 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1988, “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: 
An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-316.  
Murphy, K.J., 1999,  “Executive Compensation,” Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, edited 
by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card.  
Murphy, K.J. and J. Dial, “General Dynamics: Compensation and Strategy (A),” HBS No. 494-
048.  
Quinn, B., “Letters to the Editor: Stock Options: Heads We Win, Tails You Lose,” Wall Street 
Journal, April 19, 2002. 
Rappaport, A., 1999,  “New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance,” 
Harvard Business Review, March-April. 
Roberts, G.R., 1998,  “Corporate Governance and the Power of Ownership,” The Corporate 
Board, September/October. 
Salter, M.S., “Innovation Corrupted: The Rise and Fall of Enron,” HBS No. 903-032. 
Simons, R. 2000, Performance Measurement and Control Systems for Implementing Strategy.  
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Smith, A., 1937, Wealth of Nations (1776; ed. E. Cannan, 1904). Reprint: New York, NY: 
Modern Library. 
Tufano, P., 1996,  “Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management 
Practices in the Gold Mining Industry,” Journal of Finance  51 (4). 
Welch, J. with J.A. Byrne, 2001, Jack: Straight from the Gut, New York: Warner Books. 
Yermack, D., 1997, “Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News 
Announcements,” Journal of Finance 52 (2). 
 
 